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Abstract 
 
Scholars have investigated the characteristics of volatile voters ever since the first voter 
surveys were carried out and they have paid specific attention to the role of political 
sophistication on vote switching. Nevertheless, the exact nature of this relationship is still 
unclear. With increasing volatility over the past decades this question has furthermore grown 
in relevance. Is the growing unpredictability of elections mostly driven by sophisticated 
voters making well-considered choices or is the balance of power in the hands of 
unsophisticated ‘floating voters’? Several scholars have argued that even under conditions of 
increasing volatility switching is still mostly confined to changes to ideologically close 
parties. Most researchers, however, have used rather crude measures to investigate this ‘leap’ 
between parties. To advance research in this field we suggest to directly take into account the 
ideological distance bridged by volatile voters when investigating the link between political 
sophistication and volatility. We do this using CSES-data that encompasses a broad sample of 
recent parliamentary elections worldwide. Results indicate that voters with an intermediate 
level of political knowledge are most likely to switch overall. When taking into account the 
ideological distance of party switching, however, the confining impact of political knowledge 
on the vote choices made is clearly dominant, resulting in a linear decrease of the distance 
bridged as voters. 
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SUMMARY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It only took a few years after Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) seminal publication on the 
frozenness of European party systems for scholars to point at patterns of growing electoral 
instability. Looking at the shifts in vote shares between one election and another they 
indicated that electoral volatility was clearly rising (Pedersen, 1979, Crewe and Denver, 
1985). This was challenging for the classical theories of voting behaviour that stress the 
importance of social cleavages and hence stability. Bartolini and Mair did concede that large 
electoral changes occurred, but contended in defense of cleavage theory that (1990, p. 36): “. . 
. the volatility which matters in terms of cleavage persistence or change is the volatility which 
occurs between blocks of parties representing the opposing side of a cleavage line.” It is 
generally assumed that voters who switch to an ideologically close party are driven by 
rational considerations. Volatile voters are still thought to be bounded by ideological 
considerations and to make a structured choice (van der Meer et al., 2012). Additionally, 
switching to parties within an ideological block is often interpreted as driven by strategic 
considerations (Lachat, 2007). Voters switching between blocks, on the other hand, do not 
seem to be taking ideology into account when voting. These floating voters are described as 
“electoral drifters or rolling stones, who cast their vote almost at random” (Katz, Rattinger 
and Pedersen, 1997, p. 87). It is clear that for Bartolini and Mair (1990) only the evolution of 
the latter was relevant regarding the validity of cleavage theory. Such an approach has since 
become widely accepted. In aggregate-level as well as in individual-level research, scholars 
therefore regularly distinguish between voters who change parties within an ideological block 
on the one hand and voters changing blocks on the other (Lachat, 2007, Kuhn, 2009, van der 
Meer et al., 2013). Scholars have shown that most switching does occur within ideological 
blocks of parties. As such, even in a highly volatile context as the Dutch electoral sphere, 
volatility has been described as bounded (van der Meer et al., 2012). Clearly, when looking at 
volatility, degrees of switching have to be taken into account. 
 
It is clear that the differentiation between two kinds of switching has implications for the 
formulation of hypotheses regarding the relation between political sophistication and 
volatility. Although it is an old issue in the field of electoral behaviour, the question whether 
political sophistication increases or decreases vote switching is still unclear and intensely 
debated. We aim to gain new insights in the causal link between political sophistication and 
party switching by explicitly taking into account the aspect of ideological distance. 
 
In this paper the ideological distance of party switching will be analysed comparatively by 
focusing on parliamentary elections in democratic countries worldwide. The data come from 
the second and third module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)-project. 
We start with a review of the literature on volatility and block-volatility more specifically. 
Next, we elaborate on the scholarly debate on the link between political sophistication and 
vote switching. We then describe the data and the methods used, after which we present the 
results. We end with some concluding remarks on the implications of our findings and 
limitations of the current paper. 
 
2. TOTAL VOLATILITY AND BLOCK VOLATILITY 
 
Mogens Pedersen (1979) was one of the first scholars to draw attention to a process of change 
in electoral behaviour. Looking at the increase of net volatility at an aggregate level, he 
argued that both voters and party systems were becoming increasingly volatile. This 
observation did not remain unchallenged and Peter Mair (1993) characterized the idea of 
electoral change as being largely mythical. One of his arguments was that even though 
electoral results might indeed have become slightly more volatile, most of the changes 
observed were still confined within ideological blocks. Mair (1993, p. 124) stated therefore: 
“looking at the aggregate evidence, it is readily apparent that when voters switch, they switch 
between friends rather than between enemies.” To investigate the degree of switching 
‘between enemies’ Bartolini and Mair (1990) modified the standard volatility measure into 
so-called “block volatility”. Doing so one only considers a switch relevant when it is between 
parties belonging to different ideological blocks.  
 
(…) 
 
3. POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION: STIMULUS OR RESTRAINT FOR PARTY 
SWITCHING? 
 
Volatility as such is not problematic for a democracy and some level of party-switching 
actually reinforces the democratic credentials of an election (Blondel, 1968). Such a positive 
view on volatility relates to the normative stereotype of an “individual, educated, rational 
voter as the model citizen” that was passed on in western democracies since the Progressive 
Era (Schudson, 2000: 9). This is a voter who selects a party in an election after thoughtful 
consideration of different electoral platforms and not because she voted for this party ‘the last 
time round’. If such a citizen switches parties, one can only laud her for the cognitive effort 
involved. This normative view of the citizen is one of the reasons that the most vibrant 
discussion in relation to electoral volatility has revolved around the question whether it is the 
low or the high sophisticated voters who are more likely to switch parties.  
 
After having investigated vote intentions of American voters in the 1948 presidential election 
campaign, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1963) concluded that voters who switch vote 
intentions are lowly interested in politics. They consequently labeled voters who are 
switching parties as ‘floating voters’. This thwarted the optimistic normative illusions on 
rational citizens and has led to a characterization of volatile voters having a low level of 
political sophistication. The implication of this perspective on volatile voters is that the 
uninterested voters hold the balance of power. This paradoxical and discomforting point of 
view has subsequently induced more research on the link between political sophistication and 
volatility (Converse, 1962, Boyd, 1986, Granberg and Holmberg, 1990). A number of 
scholars have argued that when looking into the data there is hardly any empirical evidence 
supporting the floating voter hypothesis (Converse, 1962, Daudt, 1961). Converse (1962) 
therefore suggested a modification of the floating voter hypothesis for campaign volatility. He 
argues that faced with political information, a dual process is at work. While the lower 
sophisticated are very susceptible to changing preferences, they are also very unlikely to 
perceive cues for change, rendering them more stable than originally thought. The higher 
sophisticated then, are more likely to perceive political information and are therefore more 
likely to switch preferences. As their level of sophistication increases, however, these voters 
become more and more resistant to change. This reasoning is very much in line with Zaller’s 
(1992) findings on the link between political sophistication and information processing and 
leads to the expectation of a curvilinear effect of political sophistication on vote intention 
switching. The modification of Converse, however, was one for switching within a campaign 
only. As far as inter-election volatility is concerned, although Lazarsfeld, Berelson and 
Gaudet (1965) did not generalize their floating voter hypothesis to switching from one 
election to another, Converse (1962) argued that for this type of switching evidence is more 
clearly in line with the hypothesis of the least involved voters switching most. But in the same 
period Benewick et al. (1969) concluded their analyses of British panel data with: “the figures 
indicated that a substantial proportion of the floating voters were well-informed and 
interested in politics.” Leaving the discussion on this topic wide open. 
 
Russell Dalton (1984), as well argues against the floating voter hypothesis. He asserts that 
since the publication of the early survey-based voter studies, the electorate has fundamentally 
changed. Through a process of societal change called cognitive mobilization, voters now have 
more cognitive capabilities and wider access to political information compared to voters in 
the 1940s and 1950s. As a consequence, current-day voters are no longer in need of 
partisanship as a vote-choice heuristic. Looking at the characteristics of voters in a number of 
western democracies, he argues that a growing group of highly sophisticated apartisans is now 
part of the electorate (Dalton, 2012, Dalton, 2013). These apartisans make their vote choices 
independent of party alignments and they are hence more volatile than partisans. Lachat 
(2007) has further built on this link between partisanship and volatility and he argues that 
predispositions are crucial to be taken into account when investigating the link between 
political sophistication and volatility. As for the effect of sophistication on volatility, Lachat 
argues that a curvilinear effect is to be expected, with most volatility among voters with a 
middle level of political sophistication. His argument, which can be found in the work of 
Kuhn (2009) as well, is based on research on information processing. The argument is 
basically the same as the modification that was proposed by Converse (1962) for investigating 
the impact of political involvement on campaign-switching. Research on priming effects has 
previously indicated that citizens who are highly attentive to political news are least likely to 
be swayed by media messages. The explanation given for this finding, is that these highly 
attentive citizens have well-developed political opinions based on an extensive amount of 
information. New information therefore only has a limited impact on these citizens’ attitudes 
(Krosnick and Brannon, 1993). Similarly, Zaller (1992) has indicated that low informed 
voters are most responsive to election-specific influences. Well informed voters, on the other 
hand, have well developed political attitudes and quite often a strong party identification as 
well. As a result, campaign messages are only having a limited impact among this group. 
Previous research clearly indicates that as voters are exposed to political information, a dual 
process is at work. While political experts are more likely than political novices to perceive 
new information, they are also less likely to change accordingly. Originally suggested as an 
expectation on the short-term first and foremost, the expectation of curvilinear effects has 
been confirmed in a number of studies on campaign volatility (Boyd, 1986, Latimer, 1986). 
Lachat (2007) and Kuhn (2009), then, expect curvilinearity for both campaign- and inter-
election volatility. As a result, with regard to our analysis of inter-election volatility as well, 
we expect to find a nonlinear relationship with highest levels of volatility among voters with 
an intermediate level of political sophistication. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of switching parties from one election to another is highest 
among voters with an intermediate level of political sophistication. 
 
Even though it seems obvious to take into account whether voters switch to ideologically 
close or distant parties when investigating the link between political sophistication and 
volatility, this has only rarely been done. Both Lachat (2007) and Kuhn (2009) do distinguish 
between within- and between-block switching in the German and/or Swiss context, but 
neither of them posits a different hypothesis for the effect of political sophistication on 
volatility for the two types of volatility. A nonlinear relationship is by both authors argued to 
be expected for within-block switching as well as for between-block switching. Looking at 
their results for switching from one election to another, a strong curvilinear pattern, with the 
middle sophisticated voters most likely to switch, can indeed be observed when switching 
between party blocks is considered. For within-block switching, the evidence does not suggest 
a curvilinear pattern, however. These contradictory results for both types of volatility have 
been interpreted as surprising and have led Kuhn (2009, p. 484) to assert that her results: 
“reveal however also the necessity to further reflect and investigate on the effect between 
political sophistication, particularly on the striking differences of between- and within-block 
changes.” 
 
Trying to explain the high likelihood of within-block switching among the high sophisticated 
in Germany, Lachat (2007) refers to the practice of strategic voting in the German electoral 
context. Strategic considerations are expected to be cognitively quite demanding and cues 
given by parties to enhance strategic voting as well are most likely to be perceived by political 
experts, hence the high presence of within-block switching among the high sophisticated. 
Additionally, Lachat (2007) indicates the asymmetry in political information between large 
and small parties as a source for high sophisticated voters’ high likelihood of within-block 
switching. Given the relative scarcity of information on smaller parties, only high 
sophisticated voters can be expected to be exposed to this information and to subsequently 
switch to a small party within ‘their’ block. While not excluding the impact of strategic voting 
and information, we suggest that the ideological distance of parties within a party block is 
crucial in this regard. High politically sophisticated voters have previously been found to have 
better developed political attitudes than political novices (Zaller, 1992). Therefore, we expect 
that ideology is an important restraint for high politically sophisticated voters who switch 
parties, which can explain their high rate of within-block switching. We test the 
straightforward hypothesis that as voter’s level of political sophistication increases, the 
ideological distance bridged from one election to another is smaller. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher a voter's level of political sophistication, the smaller the ideological 
distance she bridges from one election to another. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.1. Data and Coding 
 
In order to test the hypotheses presented above, we need sufficient variation in the ideological 
distance bridged by voters switching parties from one election to another. Therefore, ideally, 
we make use of a sample of voters in a large number of modern democracies. For this 
purpose, we make use of the data provided by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES)-project. Given that we are focusing on volatility at an individual level, we are 
confined to those surveys within the project that included a recall question on previous voting 
behaviour. Such a question was included from the second module of the CSES-project 
onwards, therefore the data used for the  current analyses are from the second and third 
modules of CSES.  
 
(…) 
 
4.2. Measures 
 
Our main interest in this paper is assessing the impact of voters' level of political 
sophistication on the ideological distance they bridge from one election to another. Political 
sophistication is an abstract and complex concept in which not only knowledge, but also how 
individuals structure information is of central importance. When it comes to measuring 
political sophistication, different approaches have been suggested and are used by scholars 
(for an extensive overview see Lachat 2007). Political interest, media use, political 
involvement and levels of education are all linked to political sophistication and have been 
used as indicators of the concept. Reviewing the literature, however, several scholars have 
pointed out that political knowledge is the most direct and probably the best measure of 
political sophistication that can be used (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996, Lachat, 2007, 
Marthaler, 2008). Therefore, we make use of a measure of political knowledge as an indicator 
of voters’ level of political sophistication. Most national election surveys conducted in the 
framework of the CSES-project contain three knowledge questions. These are designed in 
such a way by the national survey teams that questions are answered correctly by two thirds, 
half and one third of the respondents respectively (Grönlund and Milner, 2006).i Summing the 
number of correct answers on the three knowledge questions gives us for each respondent a 
score of political knowledge ranging between 0 and 3. Additionally, in order to take into 
account between-country variation in voters’ political knowledge scores, we standardized the 
measure for political knowledge by dividing individuals’ knowledge score by the average 
knowledge score in their election sample (Singh and Thornton, 2013). Doing so, the 
categorical measure of political knowledge is transformed into a continuous one. 
 
(…) 
 
4.3. Method 
 
The data have a hierarchical structure, with respondents nested in elections and these elections 
nested in countries. A number of different approaches can be used to take this nested structure 
into account. For the current analysis, given our interest in the general effect of political 
sophistication on vote switching, our focus is at the individual level only. Furthermore, there 
is a substantial amount of variation in electoral systems, political contexts and election-
specific factors across the elections sampled and all these factors can be argued to affect the 
degree of switching. In order to control for the potential impact of all of these contextual 
factors, we present the results of fixed effects models that include election-specific dummies.ii  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
As a first step, we investigate the relation between political knowledge and voters’ likelihood 
of switching parties in general. Doing so, we do not take into account the ideological distance 
bridged or whether respondents switch to parties within or between blocks. Either a voter 
switches parties from one election to another or she doesn’t, which is modeled in terms of a 
logit function.  
 
The results of the analyses are presented in Table 3. In Model 1 only the main effect of 
political knowledge is included, Model 2 additionally includes its squared term, allowing to 
test for a curvilinear effect of political sophistication on party switching. Looking at the 
control variables, we can observe that as voters are older, they are less likely to switch parties 
from one election to another. There are no significant differences in the probability of 
switching for male and female voters, but college education is a significant predictor. As the 
results indicate, respondents holding a college degree are significantly more likely to report 
having switched parties. Results furthermore confirm previous evidence indicating that 
switching parties is an expression of political disaffection. As their level of satisfaction with 
democracy increases, respondents are less likely to report party switching. Similarly, as voters 
have a higher sense of political efficacy, they are less likely to switch parties from one 
election to another. Not surprisingly, the effect of being close to a particular party is strong 
and highly significant, a result which confirms the need to control for partisanship when 
investigating what determines volatility. The ideological distance to the party that is closest to 
the party previously voted for is not a significant predictor of party switching. Controlling for 
differences across the electoral contexts in the sample by means of fixed effects, we do not 
observe that being more close to an alternative party makes a voter more likely to switch 
parties from one election to another. 
 
Our main interest is in the effect of political knowledge, which we use as a proxy for 
respondents' level of political sophistication, on volatility. As clear from Model 1, only 
including the main effect of political knowledge does not indicate a statistically significant 
effect of political knowledge on party switching. Additionally including the squared effect of 
knowledge in Model 2 does indicate a statistically significant effect of political knowledge on 
party switching. We observe a positive and significant effect of the main term and a 
significant negative effect of the squared term of knowledge. As such, these results do 
indicate a curvilinear effect of political sophistication on party switching. While Model 2 has 
a slightly better model fit compared to the first model, as evident from the somewhat lower 
AIC-value, it is equally obvious that the explanatory power of both models is rather low. 
 
Table 3. Explaining party switching 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
Constant 0.819*** 
(0.129) 
0.747*** 
(0.141) 
Age -0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
Female 0.011 
(0.033) 
0.013 
(0.033) 
College education 0.104** 
(0.030) 
0.102** 
(0.030) 
Political knowledge  -0.028 
(0.024) 
0.157* 
(0.077) 
Political knowledge²  -0.089** 
(0.027) 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.115*** 
(0.021) 
-0.116*** 
(0.020) 
Political efficacy -0.058** 
(0.019) 
-0.059** 
(0.019) 
Close to a party -1.105*** 
(0.058) 
-1.105*** 
(0.058) 
Distance to closest party -0.091 
(0.092) 
-0.090 
(0.092) 
Election dummies included Yes Yes 
χ² 2970.79*** 2978.66*** 
Df 28,078 28,077 
McFadden Pseudo-R² 0.090 0.091 
AIC 30,019.79 30,013.92 
Correct predictions 73.63% 73.72% 
N individuals 28,120 28,120 
N elections 33 33 
Estimates of logistic regression in Stata. Dummies for election-specific fixed effects included (not shown). 
Standard errors are robust for 33 election-clusters in the data. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001. 
 
 
(…) 
 
In a next step, we go beyond dichotomizing between switchers and non-switchers and take 
into account the ideological distance bridged by voters switching parties. Doing so, we no 
longer expect curvilinear effects but a linear decrease of the distance bridged as voters' level 
of political knowledge increases. For the analyses, we recode the ideological distance bridged 
by voters in 16 categories, breaking down the continuous variable in groups of half a point on 
the ideological scale. Doing so reduces overdispersion somewhat, while still taking into 
account differences in the ideological distance bridged. Given that stability dominates in the 
sample and because among switchers most voters change to ideologically close parties the 
data is nevertheless still very skewed towards zero (variance of 5.98 and mean of 1.22). 
Adding to this skewness, the dependent variable is bounded and cannot take values less than 
zero (King, 1988).iii As a consequence, assuming a poisson or negative binomial distribution 
are possible modeling options. After including all our independent variables, there is still a 
significant amount of overdispersion, which is why we present the results of negative 
binomial models. In essence, a negative binomial model is a Poisson regression that is 
extended by estimating a dispersion parameter as well (Atkins & Gallop, 2007). 
 
As we did for the models investigating what explains switching, for the distance of switching 
as well we present two models. Model 1 only includes the main effect of political knowledge. 
In Model 2 we test for a curvilinear effect by including both the main and the squared effect 
of political knowledge. Looking at the model fit statistics at the bottom of Table 4 first, as for 
the logit models, the explanatory power of the models is clearly very low (Nagelkerke R2 of 
0.049 for both models). The significant α-statistic indicates that a negative binomial modeling 
approach performs better than an alternative poisson model. For the covariates, effects are 
mostly in the same direction as for the logit model. First, as voters grow older, they bridge a 
significantly smaller distance from one election to another. There are no significant 
differences between male and female voters or between voters holding a college degree and 
voters without a college degree. The variables capturing voters’ sense of political disaffection 
are negative and significant. As voters are more satisfied with democracy and have a higher 
sense of political efficacy, they bridge a significantly smaller ideological distance. Clearly, 
the politically disaffected are not only more likely to switch parties (as clear from Table 3), 
their switches are also more extreme. The effect of closeness to a party is strong and 
significant and indicates that voters identifying with a political party are more ideologically 
restricted in their vote choices. The ideological distance to the closest party then, similarly as 
to what we observed for party switching, is not a significant predictor of the distance bridged.  
 
Contrary to what could be observed for the logit model, when taking into account the distance 
of party switching, the effect of political sophistication on switching seems to be linear. The 
statistical fit for both models is about the same, but when only including the main effect of 
knowledge indicates a negative effect of knowledge on the distance bridged. When including 
both the main and the squared effect, on the other hand, none of them reaches a conventional 
level of statistical significance.  
 
Table 4. Negative binomial models of ideological distance of party switching 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B 
(s.e.) 
B 
(s.e.) 
Constant 1.749*** 
(0.120) 
1.715*** 
(0.128) 
Age -0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
Female -0.013 
(0.034) 
-0.012 
(0.034) 
College education 0.044 
(0.026) 
0.044 
(0.026) 
Political knowledge  -0.099*** 
(0.028) 
-0.015 
(0.078) 
Political knowledge²  -0.041 
(0.029) 
Satisfaction with democracy -0.100*** 
(0.022) 
-0.100*** 
(0.022) 
Political efficacy -0.069*** 
(0.020) 
-0.070*** 
(0.020) 
Close to a party -0.899*** 
(0.044) 
-0.899*** 
(0.044) 
Distance to closest party 0.126 
(0.069) 
0.126 
(0.069) 
Election dummies included Yes Yes 
α 5.656*** 5.656*** 
χ² 1,399.31*** 1,400.61*** 
Df 28,077 28,076 
McFadden pseudo-R² 0.020 0.020 
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 0.049 0.049 
AIC 70,280.73 70,281.43 
N individuals 28,120 28,120 
N elections 33 33 
Estimates of a negative binomial regression in Stata. Dummies for election-specific fixed effects included. 
Standard errors are robust for 33 election-clusters in the data. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001. 
 
(…) 
 
Taking into account the ideological distance of volatility, therefore, results seem to confirm 
our second hypothesis. As a voter’s level of political knowledge increases, the ideological 
distance bridged from one election to another is significantly smaller. The level of political 
sophistication of a voter affects how ideologically constrained she acts in the voting booth. If 
highly sophisticated voters switch, then, they do so to parties that are relatively close 
ideologically. Of the dual process which is found to be at work with regard to switching in 
general, therefore, it is the effect of sophistication restraining change that dominates once the 
ideological distance bridged is taken into account as well. 
 
Finding a linear effect for political knowledge when taking into account the ideological 
distance bridged by voters indicates that especially high knowledgeable voters are 
ideologically restrained when casting their vote. As such, the results provide an explanation 
for contradictory findings when investigating the link between political sophistication and 
volatility for within- and between-block volatility separately. Political experts seem to be 
more bounded by ideological considerations when casting a vote, resulting in smaller 
ideological switches. Dichotomizing between switchers and stable voters, a slight curvilinear 
effect of political knowledge on volatility is apparent, which does indicate that some level of 
knowledge is needed before voters consider changing parties. When conceptualizing volatility 
as the ideological distance voters bridge from one election to another, however, the 
restraining impact of political knowledge on voters' electoral choices is more clearly visible. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Voters’ level of political sophistication affects whether or not voters switch parties from one 
election to another. Looking at voters switching parties from one election to another, 
switchers are not like the typical ‘floating voters’ described by the Columbia school scholars. 
Although voters with the highest level of knowledge about politics are least likely to switch, a 
slight curvilinear pattern is a more correct representation to describe the link between 
sophistication and inter-election volatility. As such, the modification of the floating voter 
hypothesis proposed by Converse (1962) to describe campaign volatility seems to be valid for 
switching between elections as well. Theory predicts a dual effect of political expertise when 
switching in general is looked at. Only voters with a minimum level of knowledge of politics 
are expected to be open to changing parties from one election to another. As voters’ level of 
knowledge about politics increases, however, voters should become resistant to change. Our 
results provide evidence for this latter mechanism, it seems as if the well-developed political 
attitudes of the higher knowledgeable cause a resistance to change.  
 
Whether voters are political novices or political experts not only affects their probability of 
switching parties, it also has an impact on the ideological distance bridged. The higher voters’ 
level of knowledge about politics, the more ideologically constrained the vote choice of these 
voters. This implies that if a political expert switches at all, it will be to a party that is 
ideologically very close to the party previously voted for. As a consequence, if one is 
interested in the effect of political sophistication on electoral volatility, one should not 
distinguish within- from between-block switching. Voters switching between parties of 
different ideological blocks and voters switching within a block of parties are most likely to 
be different in terms of levels of political sophistication. As a result, investigating both groups 
separately would blur the effect that political sophistication has on voters’ likelihood of 
switching parties in general. 
 
Taking into account the ideological distance bridged by voters when investigating volatility, 
gives us some additional insights on a number of theories on what explains volatility. In 
accordance to Zelle's (1995) theory of frustrated floating voters, voters who are dissatisfied 
with democracy and who have low levels of political efficacy are more likely to switch 
parties.  
 
Obviously, the current study suffers from some important limitations. First, we look at the 
distance bridged by volatile voters only in terms of left and right. Although the left-right 
spectrum has previously been labeled a super-issue, ideally all the relevant dimensions in a 
party system should be taken into account for calculating the true distance between parties. 
Second, investigating voters who are changing parties from one election to another, we make 
use of cross-sectional data including a recall question. The reliance on this type of questions is 
likely to bias our findings, given that we expect a substantial amount of faulty recalls. 
Additionally, it is especially the lower sophisticated who can be expected to report false 
consistency in voting behaviour. All these elements, including the low level of explained 
variance of the models, are caveats to our conclusions. These limitations are not only relevant 
for this particular paper, but for electoral research in general. We are using one of the best 
comparative sources for electoral research available and are still limited in providing answers 
to what is an elementary question in political science: who changes parties between elections? 
Therefore one of the major conclusions of this research is that we need better data if we want 
to take new steps in research on volatility. Panel-data would be the most appropriate to 
investigate this, but current data-availability hinders doing so for a broad set of countries. 
Given the limited amount of variance in the ideological distance between parties in single 
countries, we can only call upon scholars of political science to engage in efforts of collecting 
comparative panel-data on voting behaviour. Further research, both in single countries and 
from a comparative perspective is needed to validate whether our results hold when using 
panel data and incorporating multiple ideological dimensions as well. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i For the estimation sample, the three knowledge items were answered correctly by 77%, 62% and 34% of the 
respondents respectively. 
ii Estimating fixed effects models comes with the cost of not allowing to investigate differences across countries 
in the effect of political sophistication on vote switching. To investigate this possibility we also estimated a 
hierarchical linear model with besides random intercepts at the election level also a random slope of the effect of 
political knowledge. These analyses indicated that there is virtually no variation across elections in the slope of 
political knowledge, indicating that the pattern observed is a general one. Results of these additional analyses are 
available from the authors upon request. 
iii As King (1988) has shown, for data with such distributional properties, log transforming the dependent 
variable and estimating an OLS regression  leads to biased estimates. 
